Critique on Salafibism and it's Significance for Indonesian Islamic Moderation: Study on Khaled Abou El-Fadhl's Thought

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Abstract
This paper aims to prove the importance of Khaled Abou el-Fadhl's (b. 1963) critique on Salafibism for mainstreaming Islamic moderation in contemporary Indonesia. This research examines Khaled's critique using the approach of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*, a technique that analyzes the nature, secrets, and purposes of Islamic teachings including its laws. The problem examined in this research is the significance of Khaled's critique on Salafibism for mainstreaming Islamic moderation in contemporary Indonesia. This research concludes that from the perspective of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*, Khaled's critique on Salafibism is crucial for mainstreaming Islamic modernization in present-day Indonesia. The significance of the critique lies in three things: (1). Providing the new awareness and energy for Indonesian Islamic scholars to campaign for moderate Islam and rejects puritanical Islam, especially Salafibism. (2). It provides theoretical guidance for the Islamic moderation movement in Indonesia, especially the importance of the balance between literalism and *maqāṣid* as well as between text and context in understanding the holy book. (3). Creating the practical guidance for the Islamic moderation movement in Indonesia to counter extremism. This research indicates that adopting a moderate approach to Islam holds significant promise for achieving local, national, and global religious harmony. In contrast, the puritanical approach, which hinders such concord, should be abandoned.

Keywords: Critique, puritanism, salafibism, Islamic moderation, contemporary Indonesia

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Introduction

The existence of terrorist acts in the name of jihad indicates that understanding sacred texts in the context of the modern world is still problematic. Khaled Abou el-Fadhl asserts that the terrorists' ideology closely aligns with puritanism, a belief system adopted by only a small fraction of the global Muslim population.[1] Understanding the fallacy of puritanism will prevent people from falling into its trap. As the foremost expert in this field, it is crucial to study and disseminate Khaled's insights to the public. In this era of democracy and information openness, an honest study of Salafibism ideology is essential to provide a clear perspective on acceptable and unacceptable Islamic ideologies.

Khaled M. Abou el-Fadhl is a critical expert in Islamic legal studies. This professor of Islamic law at UCLA, USA, has a long experience in Islamic studies. The Kuwaiti-born man studied classical Islamic law in Kuwait and Egypt. In addition to his studies in law at Yale and Princeton, he is renowned for his expertise in integrating classical Islamic values into modern contexts and is celebrated as a paragon of liberal Islam. His contributions extend beyond writing on morality and universal humanity; he is also a distinguished public speaker. He is highly critical of the ideologies of puritanism and terrorism. He has collected his thoughts in various works, such as The Search for Beauty in Islam: A Conference of the Books,[2] The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, [3]

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[1] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2005), 6, 11-18, 103.

[2] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *The Search for Beauty in Islam: A Conference of the Books* (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

[3] Khaled, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists.*

Islam and the Challenge of Democracy,[4] The Place of Tolerance in Islam,[5] Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law,[6] Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women,[7] And God Knows the Soldiers: The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses,[8] Conference of the Books: The Search for Beauty in Islam,[9] The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses: A Contemporary Case Study,[10] and Reasoning with God: Reclaiming Shari'ah in the Modern Age.[11] Some of these books have been translated into Arabic and Indonesian. The Indonesian versions of Khaled's works have been widely read and discussed by Indonesian students.

In addition to writing in the form of books, Khaled is also productive in writing in journals and contributing to other people's books. Dozens of scientific articles were born from his hands. Among them are "The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources,"[12] "Islam and the

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[4] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[5] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *The Place of Tolerance in Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002).

[6] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[7] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2001).

[8] Khaled Abou El Fadl, *And God Knows the Soldiers: The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America/Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).

[9] Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Conference of the Books: The Search for Beauty in Islam* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America/Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).

[10] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses: A Contemporary Case Study.* 3rd edition (Washington, D.C.: Al-Saadawi Publishers, 2002).

[11] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *Reasoning with God: Reclaiming Shari'ah in the Modern Age* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).

[12] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, "The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources," *The Muslim World* LXXXIX, no. 2 (April 1999): 144-157.

Challenge of Democratic Commitment,"[13] "Islam and the Theology of Power,"[14] and "Islamic Authority in New Directions in Islamic Thought: Exploring Reform and Muslim Tradition,"[15] and "The Epistemology of Truth in Modern Islam."[16]

Khaled, an accomplished speaker, often delivers scientific speeches, the recordings of which are freely available online, greatly aiding scholars in understanding his perspectives.[17]

One of the pioneering books in Indonesian that has examined Khaled's thoughts on Salafibism is *Islam dalam berbagai Pembacaan Kontemporer.*[18] Unfortunately, this complicated topic has not been studied in depth because it is only one of the many issues in the book. Khaled's thoughts are only touched upon descriptively. Nevertheless, the book effectively captures the essence of Khaled's ideas. Equally significant is Khaled Medhat Abou El-Fadl's study, 'The Method of Istinbāṭ al-ḥukm on Gender.[19] Although it examines Khaled's thoughts, this thesis focuses its discussion on the legal theory adopted by Khaled, especially in making jurisprudence around gender

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[13] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, "Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment," *Fordham International Law Journal* 27, no. 1 (December 2003): 4 – 71.

[14] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, "Islam and the Theology of Power," *Middle East Report 221* (Winter 2001): 28 – 33.

[15] Khaled Abou El-Fadl, "Islamic Authority in New Directions in Islamic Thought: Exploring Reform and Muslim Tradition" in Kari Vogt, Lena Miller and Christian Moe (ed.) (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009).

[16] Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The Epistemology of Truth in Modern Islam," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 41, no. 4-5 (2015): 473-486, doi: 10.177/019/1453715577739.

[17] Internet website: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AvIp68IgqzA

[18] Tholhatul Choir dan Ahwan Fanani (ed.), *Islam dalam berbagai Pembacaan Kontemporer,* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2009).

[19] Mahdaniyal H.N, *The Method of Istinbath al-Hukm on Gender By Khaled Medhat Abou el Fadhl* (Semarang: Tesis IAIN Walisongo, 2010).

issues and discussed Salafibism shallowly.

While a thorough examination of Khaled's perspective on the fallacies of puritanical ideology remains absent, previous research has predominantly explored his views on Islamic law within modern societal contexts. This can be seen, for example, in the writings of Angus M. Slater[20] and Ulya.[21] Some writers have studied Khaled's critique of puritanism, but these studies tend to be descriptive and have not been linked to the contemporary Indonesian context. This can be seen in Ibnu Farhan's work.[22] Dian Suhandari's work, similarly, involves a hermeneutic analysis distinct from the contemporary Indonesian context.[23] Like Dian, A. Rafiq Zainul Mun'im[24] and Nurun Nisaa Baihaqi[25] also examine Khaled's critique of puritanism but their studies have not been linked to contemporary Indonesia. That is why this research is important considering that as the largest Muslim nation in

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[20] Angus M. Slater, "Queer(ing) Notions of Islamic Authority: A Methodological Disposition in the Work of Khaled Abou El Fadl," *Theology & Sexuality* 22, no. 1-2 (2017): 25-41, doi: 10.1080/13558358.2017.1296686, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13558358.2017.1296686.

[21] Ulya, "Studi Kritis terhadap Ide Khaled Abou Al Fadl dalam *Speaking in God's Name," Hermeneutik* 9, no. 1 (Juni 2015): 139-160.

[22] Ibnu Farhan, "Aliran Puritan dan Moderat dalam Islam" *Misykah* 1, no. 1 (Januari-Juni 2016): 101-117.

[23] Dian Suhandary, "Moderat dan Puritan dalam Islam: Telaah Metode Hermeneutika Khaled M. Abou el Fadl," *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Theology and Philosophy* 1, no. 1 (2019): 19-44, http://ejournal.radenintan.ac.id/index.php/ijitp, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.24042/ijtp.v1i1.3902.

[24] A. Rafiq Zainul Mun'im, "Islam Puritan Vs Islam Moderat (Menapak Gagasan Khaled Abou el Fadl dalam The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists)," *At-Turāś* V, no. 2 (Juli-Desember 2018): 225-244.

[25] Nurun Nisaa Baihaqi, "Hermeneutika Khaled Abou El Fadl: Analisis dan Kritik Tipologi Islam Moderat dan Islam Puritan," *TAJDID* 28, no. 2 (2021): 211-232, doi: https://doi.org/10.36667/tajdid.v28i2.722.

the world, Indonesia has some citizens who are tempted by puritan ideology. In addition to filling the void of studies in this field, the significance of this research is the theoretical clarification that the actions of the Indonesian government and society since the 1998 reformation until now in rejecting extremism have actually been on the right track as theorized by Khaled Abou el-Fadhl.

This paper examines Khaled's critique of Salafibism ideology through the perspective of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*, a perspective that looks at problems in terms of the basic structure of Islamic teachings. Although Salafibism has been widely criticized even by Sulaiman bin Abdul Wahhab (d. 1794), the elder brother of the founder, some Muslims still embrace it. Sulaiman's critique was then actualized clearly by Khaled, the most comprehensive critic on Salafibism. The problem to be answered is why Khaled's critique is important for mainstreaming Islamic moderation in contemporary Indonesia. In answering this problem, this paper begins with Khaled's discussion of the clear boundary between puritan Islam and moderate Islam. Then the study continues with the identification of the puritan Islamic groups and moderate Islamic groups. The discussion continues with Khaled's critique of Salafibism ideology, which is the most influential puritanical Islamic group in the contemporary era. After understanding Khaled's critique, readers are invited to understand the significance of Khaled's critique for mainstreaming Islamic moderation in Indonesia and how to do it.

Puritanism Vs Moderatism

Most observers equate the term puritan with fundamentalist, militant, extremist, radical, fanatic, jihadist, and even simply Islamist. Each of these terms has

a different meaning although they all refer to those who hold an absolute view of Islam. Fundamentalism is a reaction to a changing political environment. However, talking about Islamic fundamentalism in the Sunni environment is misguided. Fundamentalism requires a hierarchy. Sunnis do not recognize hierarchy.[26] Shi'is recognize it. The majority of Muslims are sunnis. Thus, they do not have a hierarchy. In addition, the term fundamentalist is inappropriate when used to refer to those who hold an absolute view of Islam. Nearly all Muslim groups assert their adherence to the uṣūl, the fundamental principles or basics, of Islam. They all declare themselves to be fundamentalists (*uṣūlī*), without feeling the negative impression that this brings. Fundamentalism can also have a positive connotation, as demonstrated by the clerics who fought for independence in Indonesia.[27] Therefore, the term fundamentalism is not suitable when used to refer to radical Muslim groups. In the context of Islam, the term puritan is more suitable when used to designate the reductionist-fanatic group and narrow-minded literalism.[28] In addition to the term puritan, the terms extremist, fanatic, and radical make sense when used to describe those who are very absolute in their understanding of Islam. However, the term puritan is the most appropriate term with various considerations.

Khaled believes that some puritans are committed to the path of terrorism. That commitment is increasingly

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[26] Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), 36-7.

[27] Martin van Bruinessen, "Muslim Fundamentalism: Something to be Understood or to be Explained Away?" *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 6, no. 2 (1995): 157-171, link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596419508721050; Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002): 117–154.

[28] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 18-19.

evident.[29] That is why the puritanical view is different from the moderate view of Islam. Puritanical views that tend to be obsolete and use violent methods will only cause problems for the face of Islam. For this reason, moderate Muslims must not remain silent. So far, Muslims have been weak in consolidating themselves. Politics and interests have corrupted the ability of Muslims to see Islam as a system of faith.[30]

For Khaled, one way to repair the face of Islam from extremists is to draw a clear line between unacceptable and acceptable understandings.[31] The acceptable understanding is moderate while the unacceptable understanding is extreme. But this distinction is not well known in the Muslim world.[32]

According to Khaled, the puritans are few, but their wild movement has represented the face of Islam. The small number is not proportional to the ferocious echo of the movement. The majority of Muslims are moderates.[33] Although they can dominate the public sphere, these Islamic moderates remain sociologically and intellectually on the periphery.[34] This is because they are the silent majority.[35]

Khaled believes that some Islamic organizations such as *Jihād* Command, *al-Qā'ida, Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr,* and *Jama'at al-Muslimīn* have anchored themselves on puritanical, supremacist, and opportunist ideologies. The

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[29] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 7.
[30] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 2.
[31] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 1.
[32] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 13-14.
[33] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 15, 18.
[34] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 6,15; Khaled Abou el Fadhl, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam: Puritanisme versus Pluralisme,* trans. Heru Prasetia (Bandung: Arasy, 2003), 22; Buku *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam* translated from Fadl, Joshua Cohen, and Ian Lague, *The Place of Tolerance in Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002).
[35] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 6.

puritan ideology is held by Osama bin Laden (d. 2011), the Taliban, Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, and other jihadi organizations.[36] In Indonesia, the Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥizb Taḥrīr* Indonesia (HTI), Laskar *Jihād*, FPI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia,[37] MTA,[38] MPI (*Majelis Pengajaran Islam*),[39] and *Jamā'ah Islāmiyyah* (JI) can be categorized as purists. Just as liberal Muslim groups receive sponsorship from the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation, these groups also garner support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan.[40] Puritanism in Indonesia has its roots in Abdul Rouf Singkel and Muhammad Yusuf al-Makassari in the 17th century.[41] Although it cannot be considered dead, this ideology is a byproduct of the emergence of the dominance of Wahhabism, Salafism, and apologetic discourses in

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[36] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 55, 100-101; Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 20.

[37] Merlyna Lim, *Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet* (Washington, D.C.: the East-West Center Washington, 2005), 2; Vedi R. Hadiz, "Towards a Sociological Understanding of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia, *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 38, no. 4 (November 2008): 638–647, link**:** http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472330802311795, link**:** http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472330802311795.

[38] Ilya Muhsin dan Muhammad Gufron, "Geliat Puritanisme Islam di Indonesia: Menyibak Tabir di Balik Gerakan Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an (MTA)," *INFERENSI, Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan* 12, no. 1 (Juni 2018): 213-238, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.18326/infsl3v12i1.213-238, link: http://inferensi.iainsalatiga.ac.id.

[39] Mutohharun Jinan, "Melacak Akar Ideologi Puritanisme Islam: Survei Biografi atas "Tiga Abdullah", *Walisongo* 22, no. 2 (November 2014): 381-412.

[40] Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002): 117–154, 144-150.

[41] Ummu Farida, "Islam Pribumi dan Islam Puritan: Ikhtiar Menemukan Wajah Islam Indonesia Berdasar Proses Dialektika Pemeluknya dengan Tradisi Lokal, *FIKRAH: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan* 3, no. 1 (Juni 2015): 141-156.

modern Islam.[42] What is worse is that Islamic texts are now controlled by religious jurists who give them puritanical meanings that discourage reinterpretation and use them to protect the status quo and their intellectuals.[43]

According to Khaled, puritan ideology in the modern era can be seen in the Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines. Historically, Wahhabism was founded by the 18th-century preacher Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab (d. 1792) in the Arabian Peninsula. He practiced a strict literalism that made the text the only legitimate source of authority and displayed extreme hostility to intellectualism, mysticism, and all sectarian differences within Islam. Wahhabism rejects any attempt to interpret God's law historically and contextually. Wahhabism considers most of Islamic history to be a corruption of authentic Islam. Wahhabism defines orthodoxy narrowly and is highly intolerant of all beliefs that contradict its own.

In the 18th century, Muhammad b. Saud (d. 1765) joined this Wahhabi movement and rebelled against Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula. This revolt was full of bloodshed as the Wahhabis massacred Muslims and non-Muslims indiscriminately. In 1818, the Egyptian army led by Muhammad Ali (d. 1849) put down the rebellion. Wahhabism had sunk. However, Wahhabi doctrine was revived by Abd al-Aziz b. Saud (d. 1953) in the early 20th century. Abd al-Aziz b. Saud joined the militant Wahhabi rebels known as the Ikhwan to give rise to Saudi Arabia. Until the 1970s, thanks to soaring oil prices, Wahhabism's influence expanded slightly in the Islamic world.[44]

Wahhabi thought wields its most significant

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[42] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 79, 94.

[43] Milton Viorst, "Puritanisme dan Kemandekan", in Khaled Abou El Fadhl, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 44; Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 20-22.

[44] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 25.

influence under the guise of Salafism, rather than directly under its own banner. In their literature, Wahhabi imams consistently describe themselves as Salafis and not Wahhabis.[45] Salafism is a doctrine founded by Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), Jamaluddin al-Afghani (d. 1897), and Muhammad Rashid Ridha (d. 1935) in the late 19th century. Salafism calls for Muslims to follow the example of the Prophet and his companions (*as-salaf ash-shāliḥ*). Methodologically, Salafism is almost identical to Wahhabism except that Wahhabism is more intolerant of diversity and dissent. The founders of Salafism maintained that all Muslim issues should be returned to the Qur'an and Sunnah.[46] Initially, Salafism was not anti-intellectual. It was similar to Wahhabism in that it tended not to be interested in history. Salafists idealize the time of Prophet Muhammad and the Companions and ignore the balance of history.[47] Salafism was founded by Muslim nationalists who were eager to interpret modernist values following original Islamic sources. Therefore, Salafism is not anti-Western.[48] That was the liberal period of Salafism. The liberal period ended in the 1960s. After that, Salafism adhered strictly to literalism and rejected the interpretation of sacred texts. Allegedly, sympathizers of Wahhabism were responsible for this change in orientation. Meanwhile, since 1975, Wahhabism has gradually shed its extreme intolerance and become so closely aligned with Salafism that the two are now indistinguishable.[49] Both take refuge in literalism.[50] Of course, this attitude is problematic when viewed from the perspective of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*, which

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[45] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 74-75.
[46] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 75.
[47] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 76.
[48] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 77.
[49] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 77.
[50] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 53.

emphasizes the balance between literalism and the basic purpose of Shari'ah (protecting religion, soul, mind, offspring, and property).[51] Neither ideology envisions a golden age of Islam as it was in 750-1258 CE.[52] Neither is interested in critical historical research and responding to the challenges of modernity. Wahhabism asserts that its strict, literal adherence to Islamic texts represents the most direct path in Islam, arguing that this unyielding interpretation is beyond challenge. To address criticism, this interpretation is presented not as the view of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab or any single figure, but as a faithful adherence to the principles of al-salaf al-shāliḥ (the prophet and the companions). The Wahhabis utilize the symbols and categories of Salafism. Salafism, founded initially as a liberal ideology, was intended to address modern challenges, urging Muslims to revisit the Qur'an and Sunnah and align with their interpretations. It is this interpretation of the text that Wahhabism avoids. Wahhabism opposes the indeterminacy of modern times by escaping into strict literalism and pure ritual practice. Wahhabism also rejects historical interpretations of the *shari'a.*[53]

The deflection of Salafism from a liberal modernist ideology to a literalist-puritan-conservative doctrine was obvious in the early 1970s. The soaring oil prices in 1975 enabled Saudi Arabia to become a major backer of Wahhabism. The spread was carried out using the mask of Salafism. Wahhabism's interpretation of Salafism calls for a return to the pure, original tenets of the religion, untainted by historical practices. Of course, the path taken

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[51] Abū Isḥāq ash-Shāṭibī, *al-Muwāfaqāt,* edisi; Abdullah Darāz (Kairo: Maṭba'ah ar-Rahmaniyyah, n.d) II: 225-230.
[52] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 76, 79, 163.
[53] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 19, 53, 233.

is to utilize literalism[54] which is problematic in the eyes of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh.*

The Wahhabi movement has contributed very closely to the ideology of puritanism among contemporary Muslims. The movement finds difficulties to accept any other understanding than its own ideology. Characterized by a cynicism towards alternative interpretations of Islam, the movement founded by Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab is often suspicious and hesitant to associate with other groups.

According to Khaled, the essence of Wahhabi ideology can be summarized as follows:

a. A return to the Bedouin tradition of Islam, loathing intellectualism, mysticism, and diversity in Islam.
b. Back to text literalism (Quran and Sunnah).
c. Rejects the diversity of schools in fiqh,
d. It is easy to accuse others who disagree with them of heresy.
e. Islam is black and white (clear-cut dichotomy), there is no middle ground (gray).
f. Very hateful towards non-Muslims.
g. Recognize the doctrine of *al-wala' wa al-barra'* (loyalty and severance) in the Wahhabi doctrine.
h. It led to viewing the Ottoman Turks as infidels.
i. It allowed Wahhabi supporters to torture those who opposed Wahhabi views.
j. The Wahhabi doctrine rigidly maintains that there is only one true Islam, their own, and considers all other interpretations as shirk, warranting severe punishment, including death, for their followers.[55]

Khaled believes that puritan ideology as seen in

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[54]Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 26.
[55] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 45-76.

Wahhabi ideology has a clear boundary from moderate Islamic ideology. While moderates tend to be defensive and quiet, purists are not. Puritans tend to be aggressive, enthusiastic, vocal, and well-funded. Moderate Islamic ideology emphasizes a balance between literalism and universal ethical principles.[56] Moderates believe that killing civilians is prohibited by Islam while some puritans do not. Islamic law for moderates prohibits killing prisoners, mutilating enemy soldiers, and cruel interrogations.[57] Some purists never interact with the ethics or reflect on the substance of Islam. They always rely on the sword. That is why some puritans are closer to terrorism. Terrorism is an act of mobilizing power through the spread of fear. For Khaled, the puritan influence on the Islamic intellectual heritage and the humanistic and universalistic orientation in Islam is nothing but destructive. Concerning terrorism, Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (d. 2022), and the Taliban, as well as other Muslim extremists, share this puritanical orientation.[58]

In contrast to the puritans, the moderates hold the view that Islam will be suitable for all times. Rather than treating their religion as a fossilized monument, they embrace it as an active and dynamic faith.[59] As a result, moderate Muslims will honor the achievements of the Muslim past even as they remain alive today. The reforms they promote are not meant to ignore or replace God's will (*irādah)* but are meant to realize God's will by better respecting the integrity and coherence of belief. Moderate

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[56] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 25, 129, 137, 156-177.

[57] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 243.

[58] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 100, 199, 205.

[59] Nuraan Davids, "Islam, Moderation, Radicalism, and Justly Balanced Communities," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 37, no. 3 (5 October 2017), doi: 10.1080/13602004.2017.1384672, link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1384672

Muslims uphold the dictates of the Qur'an and Sunnah by explaining that balance and moderation are at the heart of all goodness and are the essence of all profit. They understand or at least seek to understand the Islamic theology that maintains balance and moderation as the ultimate law for all beings. Moderation is a necessary characteristic for the achievement of personal, social, and political justice. The key to moral and spiritual success lies in striving to remain moderate and even-tempered, especially in moments of anger and upset. The Prophet Muhammad once explained that the hallmark of the Islamic faith is moderation and that all Muslims should set an example for others by treating all issues in a fair, balanced, and moderate manner. The majority of Muslims on earth believe in this moderation except for those marginal extremists.[60]

Unfortunately, this moderate Islamic ideology is not adequately campaigned for due to the crisis of religious authority within the Muslim community. Without a trusted authority, many groups consider themselves qualified to speak on behalf of God.[61] In the classical era, Muslim scholars created a strict qualification that a jurist must meet certain qualifications before being allowed to issue a *fatwā*. The more serious the issue, the more demanding the qualifications. Today, the institutions once responsible for implementing the qualification system have deteriorated and ultimately vanished. Now, practically anyone can appoint himself as a *muftī* and spew out *fatwā*s without any legal or social process to restrain him. Finally, a *fatwā* may be authoritative for some Muslims but not others. The decision to accept or reject a *fatwā* is entirely up to the

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[60] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 109.
[61] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 26.

individual Muslim.[62]

The result of this crisis of authority is chaos in the world of Islamic law. Since the invention of the internet, most *fatwā*s have been authored by people educated as doctors, engineers, and computer experts rather than Islamic scholars. This mess of jurisprudence confuses even the most careful Muslim.[63] Khaled says, "Jurists play an important role in providing authority in Islam."[64] Because most Islamic law is the result of legal reasoning and interpretive activity. On any important issue, one will encounter numerous legal views all claiming to be correct. In the first two centuries of Islam, there were more than 30 schools. In the classical era, the state could not produce *shari'a* law. Jurists could produce it. After the 10th century CE, most jurists received training from one of the 4 *sunnī* schools.[65] The enrichment of Islamic law comes from its extensive ethical and moral principles, varied legal methodologies, and the multitude of sometimes conflicting decisions, all of which are collectively viewed as God's law.[66] Islamic law also symbolizes the unity and communal spirit of the Muslim world. Islamic jurists are the protectors of *shari'a* and its defenders. Although they have different schools of thought, they provide the most important source of religious authority in the Muslim world.[67]

But the whole complex edifice that provided Islamic religious authority began to crumble with the introduction of Western colonialism in the 16th century. Domestic elements unrelated to colonialism, such as an inefficient tax system and a poorly organized military had begun to

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[62] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 29.
[63] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 29.
[64] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 29-0.
[65] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 32.
[66] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 33.
[67] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 34

decline before the 18th century. With the jurist's slow but sure decline in societal status, the integrity of sharia in Muslim communities was consequently weakened.[68]

The most obvious destruction of the status of jurists and the position of *shari'a* was done by local rulers created by post-colonial colonial powers. This happened in the 1950s and 1960s when the rulers were Western-educated, secular, and nationalistic military men.[69] The state determined the curriculum of Islamic schools, which ultimately limited jurists' ability to play a leadership (intellectual) role in society.[70]

Such a process has resulted in a vacuum of religious authority among Muslims in the modern world. The disintegration of the traditional institutions of Islamic scholarship and authority resulted in a kind of anarchy in the mechanism of determining Islamic authenticity. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Islamic law lost its role in society. Some jurists such as Rifaat at-Tahtawi (d.1873), Muhammad Abduh (d.1905), Rashid Ridha (d.1935), Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi (d.1902), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d.1897), Muhammad al-Syaukani (d. 1834), Muṣṭafa al-Maraghi (d. 1945), and Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) attempted to avert destruction by promoting liberal programs of *sharī'a* reform. These thinkers sought to reinterpret Islamic law to make it more responsive to modern challenges such as women's rights, human rights, democratic governance, and economic justice. Their efforts are great, but they cannot change the situation because they are not leaders of mass movements. They are also unable to fill religious authority because their voices are marginal. As a result, religious authority was quickly filled

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[68] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 35.
[69] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 35.
[70] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 36

by popular movements led by people who had never studied the liberal ideas of these scholars.[71] Although the impact of the liberal ideas was small, their thoughts inspired others such as Abd al-Majid Salim (d.1954), Mahmud Syaltut (d.1963), Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.1996), Muhammad Imarah (d.2020), Subhi Mahmashani (d.1986), Abd ar-Razaq as-Sanhuri (d.1971), Salim al-Awa (d.1942), Ahmad Hasan (d.1958), and Fazlur Rahman (d.1988). These reformers have significantly influenced the moderate tendencies in contemporary Islam. Today, it is these moderates who stand against the purists in filling the vacuum of authority that plagues the contemporary Islamic world.[72]

In 1933, Yusuf al-Dijjawi (d.1946) expressed regret that many puritan courses denounced Islamic tradition to the extent that people who had not studied *shari'a* could claim to be *shari'a* experts. Now his regret is proven and takes the form of a fact that is worse than he ever imagined.[73] These self-proclaimed experts are indeed engineers, doctors, and physical scientists. The leaders of most Islamic movements such as *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* and *al-Qā`idah* are engineers and doctors. They had not studied Islamic law properly and were not familiar with the rich tradition of Islamic law.[74]

Compared to other Muslim countries, religious authority in Indonesia tends to be better. This is due to the ideology of *Pancasila*, which places Belief in One God (*Tawhīd*) as one of the pillars of nationalism. Because of *Pancasila*, all religions are respected by the government and society. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA)

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[71] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 37
[72] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 37-8.
[73] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 38.
[74] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 39.

carries out the technical implementation of this respect. Acting as a regulator and facilitator, this ministry ensures that religious teachings are implemented in line with Pancasila's principles, advocating for a moderate and respectful approach to religion that contributes to societal harmony and unity. *Pancasila* has brought the government and society maintained and respected the religious authority of all religions. All religions have their internal systems to prepare authoritative cadres for their followers. In this context, Muslims are indebted to Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah which have never stopped producing authoritative and moderate cadres in teaching Islam that promotes peace and unity in Indonesian society.

Puritanism in Salafibism

The ideology of puritanism is evident in the Salafi and Wahhabi movements. In Khaled's view, after the 1980s, there is no doubt that Salafi and Wahhabi have become the most influential puritan movements in the Muslim world.[75] Both, by Khaled, are called Salafibism. Salafibism is made of two words, Salafism and Wahhabism. Salafibism is an ideology that combines two ideologies at once, namely Salafi ideology and Wahhabi ideology. Salafi ideology, which gained prominence in the late 19th century, was shaped by the reformist ideas of figures such as Muhammad Abduh. This ideology is supported by Muslim nationalists who are eager to explore the values of modernism in the sources of Islam and do not feel the need to be anti-Western. Wahhabi ideology, on the other hand, is an ideology founded by Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab had a puritanical spirit and cleansed Islam of all forms of corruption such as mysticism, wasilah, rationalism,

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[75] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 44.

shi'ism, and other practices called *bid'ah*.[76] Salafi's and Wahhabi's ideologies have some similarities as well as differences. The similarities lie in the method of thinking, puritanical orientation,[77] and anti-historical attitude. The key difference between these ideologies lies in their attitudes towards tolerance and intellectualism; Salafi ideology demonstrates greater tolerance for diversity than Wahhabi ideology and is more open to intellectual discourse. At the same time, Wahhabi ideology rejects intellectualism,[78] diversity, and differences of opinion.[79]

Both ideologies have their figures. The luminaries of Salafism are Muhammad Abduh, Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Rashid Rida, Muhammad Syaukani (d. 1834), and Jalal ash-Shan'ani (d. 1810). Some ascribe the ideology to Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyya (d. 1350). Salafism is interested in the most fundamental concepts of Islam and believes every Muslim should follow the examples of the Prophet Muhammad and the early generations of pious Muslims. Salafi ideological figures do things that are politically advantageous even if morally indefensible. Although they promise liberalism and the revival of the Islamic world, they often compromise religious and ethical principles in favor of political adventures.[80] Key proponents of Wahhabi ideology are Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab at-Tamimi an-Najdi and Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz (d. 1999), Muhammad b. Shalih al-Uthaimin (d. 2001), and Muhammad Nashiruddin al-Albani (d. 1999). Like the Salafi ideological figures, the Wahhabi ideological figures also did something politically advantageous although morally unjustified such

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[76] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 45.
[77] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 75.
[78] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 76.
[79] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 76.
[80] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 77.

as their rebellion against Ottoman Turkey and the spread of their ideology through violent means.

Through a complex sociopolitical process, Wahhabism was able to discard its forms of extremism and intolerance. In the 1970s it began to co-opt Salafi language and symbols until the two were indistinguishable. Both envisioned a golden era of Islam. Neither is interested in critical historical inquiry and responds to the challenges of modernity by escaping into the haven of the text world.[81] Wahhabism co-opted the Salafi creed because Salafi became the language for anti-liberal values. The result of this co-optation is what Khaled later called Salafibism. The characteristics of Salafibism are always intolerant, feeling superior (supremacist), rejecting rationalism, being oppressive to women, being hostile to artistic and creative forms of expression, and adhering to rigid literalism.[82] Salafibism rejects philosophical inquiry, political theory, and morality, and views beauty as a subjective Western invention that only leads to misguidance.[83]

The history of Salafibism is closely intertwined with Wahhabi ideology, which was revitalized in the 20th century by Abdul Aziz b. Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi state. Abdul Aziz allied with the tribes of Nejd and established the state of Saudi Arabia. The first Wahhabi rebellion in the 18th century aimed to expel the Ottoman Turks and impose Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab's puritanical beliefs on as many Arabs as possible. Wahhabis also sought control of Mecca and Medina to gain a great symbolic victory by controlling the spiritual center of the Muslim world. Although the 18th-century revolt failed, the late 19th and early 20th-century revolts were successful.

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[81] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 79.
[82] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 86.
[83] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 99.

They then imposed one version of religious understanding on the two holy cities. Under the influence of Wahhabism, diverse schools of fiqh and Shia groups, along with their symbols, were systematically destroyed and supplanted by the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. But for Khaled, the Wahhabi victory was nothing but the success of the trinity, namely the Saud family, the Wahhabis, and the British. The Saud family wanted to defeat all its rivals and control Arabia, the Wahhabis wanted to impose their puritanical understanding on Arabia, while the British wanted a strong centralized government in Arabia to serve British interests by granting exclusive oil-field concessions to British companies. In addition, Britain also wanted to weaken Ottoman Turkish power by taking Mecca and Medina away from Ottoman control.[84] This three-party alliance became powerful as each entity successfully obtained its expected share. Wahhabi got the right to spread and even impose its puritanical ideas. The House of Saud gained power. Britain benefited from the oil business.[85]

The thing to note about Wahhabis is that since the failure of the Saudi I state (1745-1818), the failure of Saudi II (1824-1891), to the success of Saudi III (1902-1932), the alliance of the Saud family and Wahhabis has inscribed the facts of intolerance, hatred, fanaticism, resulting in cruelty, murder, and cruelty. Their sins in terms of cruelty are very long. Among them are the killing of the Shi'i population in Karbala, and the killing of the Sunni population in Mecca and Medina in 1803, 1804, and 1806. The number of victims is very large and uncountable.[86] Not only that, but Wahhabis also destroyed the tombstones of the Prophet's family and his companions in Mecca, Medina, and Jubila.

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[84] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 62.
[85] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 63.
[86] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 64.

Muslims guarded all of them for more than a thousand years. Some of them are sacred and visited by millions of Muslims for centuries.[87]

Khaled argues that Salafibism should not have been able to develop because of its deviant character from the mainstream ideology of the Islamic world. However, it has survived and even expanded. This is due to four factors:

a. Able to become an ideology for Arab nationalism. This was due to his courage in rebelling against the Ottoman Turks.

b. Releasing Muslims from the burden of the rich intellectual history of the Companions and the *Tābi'īn* by referring to the authentic sources of the Quran and Sunnah, as the *Salaf ṣālih* did.

c. Mastering Mecca and Medina and considering himself the servant of both. In this way, Wahhabis can exert influence over the Muslim world, even if that influence is false.

d. The discovery of oil. Money from oil has helped Wahhabis spread their religious views.[88]

Despite accepting the fact of the rapid development of Salafibism, Khaled has never stopped criticizing Salafibism. His critique was expressed in various media and occasions. Khaled's critique has provided an honest perspective on the marriage between Salafi's and Wahhabi's ideologies. Salafi, which is actually more of an intellectual movement, was used as a platform by the Wahhabi movement, which is a political movement. The marriage may have been temporarily successful, but it was nothing more than a forced marriage. Sooner or later, the marriage will break up because the basic dispositions of

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[87] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 67.
[88] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 70-4.

the two different parties will emerge and harden over time. Salafism's identity will continue to grow and strengthen while Wahhabism's identity will continue to decline. In this era of democracy and openness, historical perspective and intellectualism on the texts of the Qur'an and Sunnah will be unstoppable. Wahhabism will not be able to block that urge. From the standpoint of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh,* historical perspective and intellectualism are highly recommended.

The builders of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh,* such as ash-Shāfi'ī, (d. 820M), al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 1025), Abū al-Ḥusain al-Bashri (d. 1044), al-Juwainī (d. 1085), and al-Gazālī (d.1111) have emphasized that the Qur'an and Sunnah are raw materials. Like the raw ingredients of a dish, they need to be processed by a skilled chef using standardized cooking methods. The expert chef is called a *mujtahid.* While the standard cooking method is called *ijtihād* or *istinbāṭ* method. An expert *mujtahid* is like a chef who is able to compromise between customer tastes, professional duties as a chef, and existing standards. That's why his dishes are always delicious and appetizing. A mujtahid cannot produce legal opinions that adequately meet the demands of the situation without a thorough understanding of historical and intellectual perspectives.

Critique on Salafibism

In the previous section, it was revealed that there are two perspectives in defining Islam: the moderate and the puritan perspectives. Although some writers prefer to use the term radical rather than puritan for practical reasons, namely to distinguish between peace-loving and terror-loving people,[89] the facts show that there are elements of

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[89] Margaretha A. van Es, Nina ter Laan and Erik Meinema, "Beyond 'Radical' versus 'Moderate'? New Perspectives on the Politics of Moderation in Muslim Majority and Muslim Minority Settings, *Religion* 51, no. 2 (05 Apr 2021): 161-168, doi:

puritanism in radicalism, although not all puritans are radicals. The perspectives of moderates and purists are different in understanding some issues. From the perspective of moderates, purists fail to understand the Qur'an because the Qur'an encourages peace rather than war. Peace is a gift from God and should not be broken except for emergency reasons. Therefore, dār al-ḥarb and dār al-amn are no longer relevant. While the puritans still use them. The puritan perspective of Islam is very clear in Salafibism. Although the number of followers of Salafibism is very small, Salafibism is very influential in the Muslim world.[90]

What is odd in the contemporary Muslim world is that while extremist groups in the past have always been marginalized and eventually treated as deviations from the teachings of Islam, today there is no sign of marginalizing their movements.[91] The moderates, who are in the majority, have not been able to unite in marginalizing this extremist movement. Why? Because the Islamic ulema system has collapsed and lost its authority. The state has co-opted the clerical system and turned clerics into paid workers.[92]

Khaled has chosen a moderate-leaning position. This

10.1080/0048721X.2021.1865616, link: https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2021.1865616; Serafettin Pektas, "A Comparative Analisis of Three Sunni Muslim Organizations on 'Moderate' and 'Radical' Islam in Egypt, Morocco and Indonesia, *Religion* 51, no. 2 (07 Jan 2021): 190-213, doi: 10.1080/0048721X.2020.1868383, link: https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2020.1868383; Margaretha A. van Es, "Norwegian Muslims Denouncing Terrorism: Beyond 'Moderate' versus 'Radical'?, *Religion* 51, no. 2 (21 January 2021): 169-189, doi: 10.1080/0048721X.2021.1865600, link: https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2021.1865600.

[90] Khaled, *The Great Theft,* 103.
[91] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 22.
[92] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 23.

can be seen in his very sharp and outspoken critique of Salafibism. For him, Salafibism has been used by terrorists to underpin their movements around the world. Salafibism has become a source of training for terrorists, although not all followers of Salafibism are terrorists. Here are some of Khaled's critiques of Salafibism:

a. Salafibism has corrupted the text. They not only rely on literalism but hijack literal texts for their purposes.

b. Salafibism deifies the role of the text and minimizes the role of human agents. Salafibism has regarded the text as the absolute truth and humans are powerless in the face of the text.

c. Salafibism tends to understand religion in a fixed and definitive way and is opposed to dynamic understanding. This is a logical consequence of over-reliance on the text.

d. Salafibism is a model of understanding influenced by Bedouin-Arab views.

e. Salafism significantly undermines the role of reason, which is a key driver of human creativity. As a result, Salafibism reinforces and justifies the texts of the past.

f. Salafibism tends to select texts that suit its interests and worldview.

g. Salafibism is imprisoned by the authority of the Salaf, those who lived in the first 40 years after Prophethood.

h. Salafibism suffers from an epistemological defect. Its main flaw lies in its closed-intolerant-literal understanding of certain verses. This understanding violates the Qur'an's moral message and contradicts the verses' historical context (Al-Hujurat: 13, Hud: 118-9, al-Maidah: 48, al-Baqarah: 62).

i. Khaled asserts that Salafibism is imprisoned by the middle-century paradigm that divides the world into *dâr salâm* (Muslims) and *dâr ḥarb* (non-Muslims) which is outdated and unrealistic.[93]

j. Salafibism is too simple to use the excuse of emergency and tends to be misplaced.[94] This is a false sense of urgency as it is a ridiculous excuse to wreak havoc on the face of the earth.

k. Salafibism ignores the Qur'an's call for Muslims always to spread forgiveness and compassion to all people.[95] They also ignore the message of the Qur'an which forbids making mischief on earth.[96]

l. The doctrine of separation of church and state is unworkable in the Islamic context.[97] A single voice representing sharia law and religious law has never existed in history. Shari'a law has historically encompassed a variety of competing schools of thought.[98]

m. Although Salafibism and terrorism have different points, they have similarities.[99] The similarities between Salafibism and terrorism can be seen in the following ways:

1. Salafibism and terrorism share the same ideological orientation and attitude of intolerance and literal rigidity. Both groups often quote al-Maidah: 51 to support their intolerant ideology. The understanding is very literal and ahistorical, so the result is exclusive and intolerant (Ali Imran:

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[93] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 220-232.
[94] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 232-3.
[95] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 236-7.
[96] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 237-8.
[97] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 21.
[98] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 22-25.
[99] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 26.

85, al-Anfal: 39, at-Taubah: 29, Muhammad, 4).

2. Both demand a normative particularism that is fundamentally text-centered.
3. Both reject the view of universal human values.
4. The two are functionalistically and opportunistically interconnected.

The points of difference are as follows: (a). In terms of power orientation, Salafibism is very limited to fellow Muslims (introverted). While terrorist groups are both introverted and extroverted. They impose power on Muslims and non-Muslims alike. (b). Suppose Salafibism is one of the theses in the world of interpretation of Islamic teachings. In that case, terrorism is an antithesis to the weakness of the Muslim world which they consider full of tyranny from within and infiltration of foreign powers.

These are the main points of Khaled's critique of Salafibism. Indeed, Khaled is not the first to criticize Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab's ideology. Two of his teachers in Medina, Shaykh Sulaiman al-Kurdi ash-Shafi'i (d. 1780) and Shaykh Muhammad Hayat as-Sindi al-Hanafi (d. 1750) predicted that the disciple would deviate and go astray from the religion. They said, "This person will go astray, and by him, Allah will lead people astray and away from Him."[100] The father of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab and Sulaiman b. Abdul Wahhab (d. 1794) (Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab's elder brother) was also the earliest critic of Salafibism ideology.[101] Muhammad's father had forbidden his son's proselytization model.[102] The

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[100] Sayid Ahmad bin Zaini Dahlan, *Catatan Pemikiran Sayid Ahmad bin Zaini Dahlan tentang Wahabisme,* trans. Agus Khudori (Jakarta: Wali Pustaka, 2003), 17.

[101] Sayid Ahmad bin Zaini Dahlan, *Catatan Pemikiran.,* 17-18.

[102] As-*Sarāwī, "Muqaddimah al-Muḥaqqiq",* in Sulaiman b. Abdul Wahhab, *aṣ-Ṣawā'iq al-Ilāhiyyah fī ar-Radd alā al-Wahhābiyyah,* (Beirut: Dar Zul faqār, 1998), 26.

critique of his elder brother, Sulaiman, was expressed in his books *Aṣ-ṣawā'iq al-Ilāhiyyah fī ar-Radd alā al-Wahhābiyyah* (Divine Lightning on the Rejection of Wahhabi) and *Faṣl al-Khiṭāb fī ar-Radd alā Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab* (Dividing Sentence on the Rejection of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab). In *aṣ-Ṣawā'iq al-Ilāhiyyah,* Shaykh Sulaiman said:

> "If you understand what I have explained before, then you are indeed disbelieving those who have testified that there is no God but Allah and that the Prophet Muhammad is his messenger, established prayer, paid zakat, fasted Ramadan, and performed Hajj because they believe in Allah, his angels, his book, his messenger, and observe all the pillars of Islam, and you make them disbelievers, their country a state of war, we ask you who is your imam? From whom do you take this schools?"[103]

A similar critique also emerged from the *uṣūl fiqh* expert, Muḥammad Abū Zahrah in *Tārīkh al-Mazāhib al-Islāmiyyah (The History of Islamic Schools)* who stated that Wahhabi (Salafibism) was similar to *Khawārij* who considered that only his group was right and other groups must be wrong.[104] Kiai Faqih Maskumambang Gresik (Indonesia) also strongly criticized Wahhabism in a book entitled *an-Nuṣūṣ al-Islāmiyyah fī ar-Radd alā al-Mazāhib Wahhābiyyah (Islamic Texts in Rejection to Wahhabi Schools)* published by the Egyptian publisher *Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyyah* in 1922. Kiai Faqih states that this sect is dangerous because of its doctrine of *takfīrī,* literalism, and

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[103] Sulaiman b. Abdul Wahhab, *aṣ-Ṣawā'iq al-Ilāhiyyah,* 42.
[104] Muhammad Abu Zahrah dalam *Tārīkh al-Mazāhib al-Islāmiyyah fī as-Siyāsah wa al-'Aqā'id* (Kairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1996), 235-8.

ḥalāl blood and property of non-Wahhabi groups.[105] However, Khaled's critique seems more contextual than previous critics because it is based on the current context of the Muslim world. In Indonesian society, Khaled's critique is crucial, as it resonates with Pancasila's emphasis on harmony and peace, and it also paves the way for mainstreaming moderate Islam locally and globally.

Although Salafibism in the context of contemporary Indonesian politics is not politically dangerous, as an ideology, it contradicts *Pancasila.* This ideology should not be allowed to grow in Indonesia. Indonesia only adheres to the *Pancasila* ideology, which is moderate and middle of the road. This ideology rejects the extreme left (communism) and also rejects the extreme right (puritanism). Since Salafibism is categorized as puritanism, *Pancasila* will automatically reject it. In this context, Khaled's critique of Salafibism provides a sharp argument for the rejection of Salafibism in Indonesia as well as an impetus for the revitalization of moderate Islam at the national and global levels.

Khaled's Critique on Salafibism and Indonesian Islamic Moderation

Although no definitive data has been found regarding the number of Salafibism adherents in Indonesia, the number of its adherents is believed to be increasing. Its indicators are the emergence of 36 educational institutions throughout Indonesia,[106]

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[105] Muhammad al-Faqih bin Abdul Jabbār al-Maskumambangi, *an-Nuṣūṣ al-Islāmiyyah fī ar-Radd alā al-Mazāhib Wahhābiyyah* (Kairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyyah, 1922).

[106] Internet website: https://www.radar96.com/2021/03/10/pp-rmi-nu-ingatkan-36-pesantren-wahabi/

hundreds of publishing institutions,[107] hundreds of online media, TV, and radio[108] affiliated with Salafibism ideology. Such developments are a concern for the government and moderate Islamic organizations.

Recognizing the danger of increasing Islamic conservatism such as Salafibism in Indonesia, the government through the Ministry of Religious Affairs encourages the religious moderation movement. Islamic Religious Universities (PTKI) are asked to become centers for the development of religious moderation,[109] although a small number of PTKI students are also exposed to puritanism.[110] This step by the government is very strategic considering that puritans in Indonesia have established schools that massively teach Islamic exclusivism with

[107] Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Islam Radikal: Tranmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005), 125; Internet website: https://www.kompasiana.com/muhammad_yasir_arafat/550d4e31a333118b1b2e3a2c/waspadai-buku-buku-wahabi-di-indonesia?page=5&page_images=1.

[108] Internet website: https://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2016/12/31/48215/pbnu-rilis-daftar-situs-islam-radikal-antinkri-dan-antipemerintah-yang-perlu-diwaspadai/; Internet website: https://nublitar.or.id/daftar-media-islam-radikal-salafi-wahabi-versi-siber-nu/.

[109] Internet website: https://www.kemenag.go.id/read/menag-minta-ptkin-jadi-pusat-pengembangan-moderasi-beragama, Jumat, 17 Desember 2021 10: 22; https://www.kemenag.go.id/read/menag-sebut-moderasi-beragama-salah-satu-solusi-terbaik-antisipasi-potensi-konflik, Rabu, 27 Juli 2022 10: 28.

[110] Dina Afrianty, "Islamic Education and Youth Extremism in Indonesia," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 7, no. 2 (2012): 134-146, doi: 10.1080/18335330.2012.719095, link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2012.719095; Nur Ali, Benny Afwadzi, Irwan Abdullah and Muhammad Islahul Mukmin, "Interreligious Literacy Learning as a Counter-Radicalization Method: A New Trend among Institutions of Islamic Higher Education in Indonesia," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 32, no. 4 (2021): 383-405, doi: 10.1080/09596410.2021.1996978, link: https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2021.1996978.

sponsors from the Middle East.[111] Khaled's critique of Salafibism is very important for strengthening religious moderation in Indonesia considering that the conservative Islamic movement in Indonesia is directly or indirectly related to this puritan ideology.

For Indonesia's moderate Islam mainstreaming movement, Khaled's critique has three significances. *First,* it provides a new awareness for Indonesian Islamic scholars that the DNA of Indonesian society, which favors harmony and peace as crystallized in the *Pancasila* ideology, clearly does not accept intolerant Islamic ideologies such as Salafibism. This new awareness provides new energy that Islam is not Arabic and that not everything that smells Arabic is Islamic. That is why, Indonesian Islamic scholars should not hesitate to state that moderate Islam is Islam that can live in the Republic of Indonesia. Puritan Islam, including Salafibism, which tends to be intolerant, does not need to be supported or embraced by the Indonesian people because of the incompatibility of its DNA with the state ideology. This critique has made Indonesians realize the importance of mainstreaming Islamic moderation which has been growing in this country since Islam first entered Indonesia.

Second, this critique provides theoretical guidance for a vision of religious moderation in Indonesia. Khaled realizes that the tension between moderate Islam and puritan Islam is not beneficial for the future of Islam. The tension only shows that the authority of the clergy in the Islamic scientific system has been bankrupted so that everyone can easily call himself a religious expert. If

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[111]Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign Transnational Islam and the Salafi Madrasa in Post-9/11 Indonesia" *South East Asia Research* 18, no. 4 (2010): 675–705, doi: 10.5367/sear.2010.0015.

medicine had lost its authority so that anyone could call himself a doctor, many patients would be exposed to malpractice. If it goes on for a long time, then people will not love medicine more but will avoid it because many people die as a result of medicine that runs without authority. The same thing is happening with Islamic science today. Puritanism which tends to choose the path of terrorism is an action taken by those who do not have religious authority. They only have excessive enthusiasm to do something and believe that the path full of problems is the right path without sufficient knowledge. People often ask Khaled by what standard they should measure the knowledge and qualifications of a person whose *fatwās* should be accepted in matters of Islamic law. The minimum qualification is that he must have received at least 20 years of formal training in Islamic law. He must be very close, know the local culture, have a balanced view, and have a humanist view. Someone who hates women, for example, is unlikely to give a fair decision regarding women's issues.[112] Khaled believes that people who meet these qualifications tend to hold moderate views.

Theoretically, Salafibism is a religious perspective that ignores the *maqāṣid* al-Qur'an, which is the general principle of Islamic teachings that asks Muslims always to spread forgiveness and compassion to all people. This ideology suffers from an epistemological flaw characterized by the act of destroying the text by relying on literalism and hijacking literal texts for the benefit of its understanding by selecting texts that suit its interests and worldview. This kind of epistemological flaw cannot be justified from the perspective of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* which demands a balance between text and *maqāshīd as* well as between text and

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[112] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 108.

context.[113] This ideology deifies the role of the text and minimizes the role of humans as agents or interpreters of the text. That is why this ideology tends to understand religion rigidly and definitively and is anti-dynamic understanding. This ideology is unrealistic because it is imprisoned by the middle-century paradigm that divides the world into *dār salâm* (Muslim) and *dār ḥarb* (non-Muslim) which is outdated and unrealistic. Therefore, this ideology is imprisoned by the authority of the *salaf,* namely those who lived in the first 40 years after prophethood. Consequently, for Salafibism ideology, Indonesia, which is not based on Islam and does not implement the Qur'an and Sunnah literally, is potentially included in the category of *dār al-ḥarb.* This is clearly unrealistic because Indonesia, although it does not implement the laws of the Qur'an and Sunnah literally, implements their essential principles such as *tawḥīd,* humanity, unity, equality of the people, and social justice. *Third,* this critique provides practical guidance for mainstreaming the vision of religious moderation in Indonesia. This critique provides a way for the Indonesian nation and the global Muslim world to carry out two things, namely the need for a moderate Islamic campaign and the need for institutions that marginalize closed and intolerant ideologies. In detail, Khaled explains these two things.

As a first step, massive dissemination of moderate ideology needs to be done continuously. Major moderate Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah

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[113] Muhammad Ābid al-Jābirī, *Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 21-251; Muhammad Ābid al-Jābirī, *The Formation of Arab Reason: Text, Tradition and the Construction of Modernity in the Arab World,* trans. the Centre for Arab Unity Studies (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers in Association with the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 2011), 225-235.

have carried out this step.[114] Khaled believes that compassion and moderation are the basic values of Islam. Both color the hearts of the majority of the world's Muslims, not extremism.[115] The Muslim mainstream should force extremists to moderate their views or extinguish the risk of violence.[116] But the problem is that the traditional Islamic institutions that historically carried out the task of marginalizing extremist beliefs are gone.[117] This is the first time in history that the center of the Muslim world, Mecca and Medina, has been under the control of a puritanical state for an extended period.[118] Indonesia is still quite fortunate that moderate Islamic organizations still play an important role in supplying moderate Islamic cadres.

Khaled even proposes some steps that moderates need to take to stem the extremists. If the Puritans shouted very loudly with weapons, the moderates should have shouted even louder and complemented it with peaceful actions such as peaceful demonstrations and the like. The moderates should do the same if the puritans publish cheap and fluffy books and media. Preferably one of their books should be refuted with 10 books from moderates. Moderates must realize that now is the time to fight against the puritan movement. Establishing institutions, scholarships, and charitable funds such as waqf is necessary to counter the puritans' propaganda.[119] If the puritans have a doctrine of violent *jihād*, then the

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[114] Leonie Schmidt, "Aesthetics of Authority: 'Islam Nusantara' and Islamic 'Radicalism' in Indonesian Film and Social Media," *Religion* 51, no. 2 (2020): 237-258, doi: 10.1080/0048721X.2020.1868387, link: https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2020.1868387.

[115] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 288.

[116] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 108-9.

[117] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 101-2.

[118] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 102.

[119] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 285.

moderates must carry out peaceful *jihād*. If the moderates do not realize the importance of intellectual *jihād* for the future of Islam, they will not be able to defeat the spirit of the puritans.[120]

Moderates have conditions that must be met to spread moderation massively. (a). They must be as well educated as possible about Islam and *shari'a*. Only then can the moderates have equal claim to the *shari'a* and potentially legitimate authority and power to define Islam. (b). They should consider engaging in defensive *jihād* to defend their religion from the onslaught of interpretations and disinformation that puritans are spewing against Islam.[121]

Khaled also hopes that non-Muslims, especially in the West, will not buy Western-published books that demonize Islam and spread hatred for Islam, as this will only increase the number of purists from the Muslim world. Such books will be translated into Arabic and the languages of the Muslim world and read by Muslims. They will add to the puritanical Muslim belief that the West is indeed fighting Islam.

Khaled also asks Westerners to pressure their governments to stop aid to any country that practices torture/persecution such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Israel. The practice of torture will only result in puritanism. The occupation of Iraq must end and finding a fair solution for Palestine will also reduce the number of puritans.[122]

To spread this moderate understanding, Khaled provides concrete steps: (a.) Returning to what the majority

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[120] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 286.
[121] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 186.
[122] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 287.

of Muslims agree on, namely the pillars of Islam.[123] (b.) Reinforcing the boundary between what is puritanical and what is moderate. [124] The boundary can be recognized by examining several key issues, such as God and the purpose of creation,[125] the origin of law and morality,[126] the approach to history and modernity,[127]democracy and human rights,[128] interaction with non-Muslims and salvation, [129] jihad, war, and terrorism,[130] and the origin and role of women.[131] (c.) Exploring a tolerant understanding. To explore a tolerant understanding of Islam, one can extract moral messages and interpret verses in light of their historical context.

Khaled realizes that there are still some issues that must be resolved because they are considered to support contemporary intolerance and violence. Among these issues are the issues of *jihād,* jizyah, and *dār al-ḥarb.* In the issue of *jihād,* the Qur'an does not use this word to refer to war. *Jihād* is a strenuous effort to serve God's purposes on earth. *Jihād* is good in and of itself, while war (*qitāl*) is not. In the Qur'an, the command of *qitāl is* always limited and conditional, while *jihād* is not. The call to jihad is absolute and unconditional.[132] Islamic tradition does not recognize the idea of holy war. *Jihād* is not a holy war. *Jihād* is only striving or struggling to seek justice. The ultimate *jihād* is against lust. If to defend oneself one must

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[123] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 114- 125.
[124] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 125.
[125] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 126-141.
[126] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 142-161.
[127] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 162-179.
[128] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 180-202.
[129] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 203-219.
[130] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 220-249.
[131] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam,* 250-273.
[132] Khaled, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy,* 29; Khaled, *Islam dan Tantangan Demokrasi,* 194.

fight, the war must not exceed the limit and the initiative to prioritize peace must still be pursued.[133] In the context of contemporary Indonesia, the contextualization of this *jihād* has been carried out by the majority of Muslims by fighting for Islam peacefully.[134] The same applies to the issue of *jizyah*. *Jizyah* is a tax that must be paid by non-Muslims living in Muslim territory in exchange for the protection they receive. *Jizyah is* a non-Arabic tradition of collecting taxes from foreign groups. Therefore, if the Muslim government was unable to protect non-Muslims, they should not be taxed. Umar refunded the tax paid by the Arab Christians for not being able to protect them from the Eastern Romans.[135] *Jizyah* is not a theological command, but a functional solution used to respond to a particular situation. That is why Umar once granted the request of a group of Christians who chose to pay zakat despite their reluctance to convert to Islam. They were reluctant to pay *jizyah* because they felt humiliated.[136] While in the issue of *dār al-ḥarb, a* realistic understanding must be used.[137] This idea may have been useful in the past due to certain situations. But now this idea is no longer relevant. In today's complex world, it is no longer feasible to categorize nations simply as either dâr al-harb or dâr as-salâm. Why? Now there are many Muslims who can live peacefully in non-Muslim majority areas such as the US and UK. Conversely, there are many Muslims who

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[133] QS/Al-Baqarah: 190.

[134] Taufiqur Rahman, "Contextualizing Jihad and Mainstream Muslim Identity in Indonesia: The Case of Republika Online," *Asian Journal of Communication* 27, no. 4 (22 January 2017), DOI: 10.1080/01292986.2016.1278251, link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2016.1278251.

[135] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 37.

[136] Khaled, *Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam*, 37.

[137] Khaled, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy*, 34; Khaled, *Islam dan Tantangan Demokrasi,* 152.

live threatened in Muslim-majority areas, such as Pakistan and Iraq. They are not threatened by non-Muslims but threatened by Muslims with extreme views.

The second step is to create institutions that can marginalize extremism.[138] In the context of contemporary Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims realize that Ministery of Religious Affairs (MORA), Islamic universities, and Islamic organizations are playing an important role in marginalizing extremism. Those institutions have been pushed to do five solutions. The five solutions are: (a) Exploring moral messages.[139] (b) Using a historical approach in understanding the text. (c). Inviting moderates to conduct a counter-*jihād* against the ideology of the puritans. (d). Returning to the intellectual wealth of the past. The acts of terrorism shown by the puritans are not justified in the historical tradition of Islamic intellectuals. For this reason, Muslims must awaken the buried humanist tradition to replace the extremist understanding of Islam.[140] Why can extremist understanding emerge and hijack the Muslim world? Because the Muslim world is experiencing a crisis of authority. Whose understanding is considered correct? Since colonialism over the Muslim world, the authority of the ulama has collapsed. The Muslim world has developed without the scientific authority of authoritative scholars. This is why extremist understandings have emerged. (e). Inviting moderates to fundraise in support of a counter-jihad movement against the puritans' *jihād* movement.

These are three significant aspects of Khaled's critique of the mainstreaming of moderate Islam in contemporary Indonesia. Scholars of Islam in Indonesia

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[138] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 102.
[139] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 3.
[140] Khaled, *The Great Theft*, 4.

need to know that since the reformation, there have been major changes in the Indonesian Muslim community. Since the reformation era in Indonesia emerged, an almost limitless freedom movement to Islamic ideologies that contradict the state ideology seems to be allowed. Islamic views such as *Jamā'ah Islāmiyah,* which jeopardize citizens' loyalty to the ideology of *Pancasila,* the unifying ideology of the nation, grow easily and continue to grow.[141] Khaled's critique is important for Indonesians to know that the Salafibism movement is very dangerous to the peace building in the scope of national and global. The perspective of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* sees Salafibism as a sect that contradicts the basic structure of Islamic teachings clarifies the importance of Khaled's critique in the context of contemporary Indonesia.

Conclusion

This study concludes that from the perspective of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh,* Khaled's critique of Salafibism is important for mainstreaming Islamic moderation in post-reform Indonesia. The importance of the critique lies in three significances (1). This critique provides new awareness and energy for Indonesian Islamic scholars to campaign for moderate Islam and reject puritanical Islam, especially Salafibism. (2). This critique provides theoretical guidance for the Islamic moderation movement in Indonesia, especially the importance of the balance between text and context and between literalism and *maqāṣid* in understanding the holy book as theorized in *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh.* (3). This critique provides practical guidance for the

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[141] Vedi R. Hadiz, "Towards a Sociological Understanding of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia, *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 38, no. 4 (November 2008): 638–647, link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472330802311795, link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472330802311795.

Islamic moderation movement in Indonesia, such as the creation of institutions to counter extremism that MORA, Islamic universities, and Islamic organizations can temporarily run.

This research produces several suggestions addressed to Muslims at large nationally and globally. They are advised to unite in socializing moderate Islam peacefully and sympathetically. In addition, Muslims should emphasize that the ideology of Salafibism is an ideology that cannot be justified scientifically especially in the perspective of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*. All Muslims should stay away from this ideology. To protect Islam from this ideology, moderate Islamic groups should make themselves the defenders of Islam from the attacks of Salafibism ideology. Law enforcement officials should respond firmly but within procedural bounds to illegal activities by followers of this ideology. Punishments for lawbreakers must be appropriate, serving as deterrents and offering rehabilitation. The government and the community can take systematic steps to prevent the development of this ideology. The ongoing religious moderation movement needs to be strengthened so that this ideology is increasingly marginalized and defeated by moderate ideology. The government also needs to immediately realize social justice and economic welfare so that this ideology does not find a trigger to grow.

This research still has limitations. The *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* approach that emphasizes the study of the principles of Islamic teachings does not lead this research to examine in detail the Islamic groups in contemporary Indonesia that adhere to the Salafibism ideology. For this reason, future research needs to be directed at this topic.

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